Upload new images. The image library for this site will open in a new window.
Upload new documents. The document library for this site will open in a new window.
Show web part zones on the page. Web parts can be added to display dynamic content such as calendars or photo galleries.
Choose between different arrangements of page sections. Page layouts can be changed even after content has been added.
Open the Navigation Management window, which can be used to view the full current branch of the menu tree, and edit it.
Move this whole section down, swapping places with the section below it.
Check for and fix problems in the body text. Text pasted in from other sources may contain malformed HTML which the code cleaner will remove.
Accordion feature turned off, click to turn on.
Accordion featurd turned on, click to turn off.
Change the way the image is cropped for this page layout.
Cycle through size options for this image or video.
Align the media panel to the right/left in this section.
Open the image pane in this body section. Click in the image pane to select an image from the image library.
Open the video pane in this body section. Click in the video pane to embed a video. Click ? for step-by-step instructions.
Remove the image from the media panel. This does not delete the image from the library.
Remove the video from the media panel.
The explanation of intentional action requires a scientific, information-theoretical basis. Internal representational states must supply the control of the behavior that counts as intentional action. How these internal states acquire their representational content and how they control the behavior that is intentional requires contact with information and meaning. Research in this area involves empirical research on humans, animals, and robotic agents and theoretical considerations about the kinds, and structure of the processes required to explain intentional action.
Embodied cognition is a new paradigm for the study of cognition. It proposes that cognition does not begin after the senses deliver information to a central system in the brain and prior to using that information to drive the motor system (to produce behavior). Theories of embodied cognition maintain that cognizing takes place completely across the sensori-motor system in such a way that sensing is not distinct from cognizing and that acting is not distinct from cognizing. Research in this area is experimental (providing data to support the theory) and theoretical (evaluating whether the theory of embodied cognition is the best way to explain the data).
Is the view that mental state content (such as concepts that are the contents of beliefs and desires and thoughts) acquire their meaning via natural law-like interactions between a subject's mind and the world. The challenges are to explain the origin of meaning such that there can be univocal representations (non-disjunctive content) and the possibility of misrepresentation (false tokening of thought symbols). Research in this area is on building such a theory and answering challenges.
Semantics of fixtion
Suppose the meaning of a name is the bearer of the name and the meaning of a predicate is a property. If this is so, then vacuous terms (fictional names or predicates) have no meaning. Yet, it seems that they do and that there are truths of fiction and about fiction. One working on the semantics of fiction has to account for the actual meanings terms of fiction have and explain away counterintuitive results if fictinal names have no meaning because they have no bearers. Research in this area is on how this can be done.
Move this whole section up, swapping places with the section above it.